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Evans: At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Martens

NOTE
AT WAR WITH THE ROBOTS: AUTONOMOUS
WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THE MARTENS CLAUSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

'[A] robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction,
allow a human being to come to harm.'
- Isaac Asimov, The First Law of Robotics'
The Three Laws of Robotics ("Three Laws")2 are an elegant set of
hierarchical rules that ethically and physically govern Isaac Asimov's
science fiction robots.3 The Three Laws are programmatically embedded
in the robots' "positronic brains,"4 and control their behavior and
reasoning primarily to safeguard the human beings they were built to
serve. 5 The Three Laws-successful in fiction for their simplicity,
1. ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 25, 37 (Bantam Dell 2008) [hereinafter I,
ROBOT].

2. Id. The Three Laws are organized thusly:
"The First Law... 'A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a
human being to come to harm.' The Second Law: 'A robot must obey the orders given it
by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.' The Third
Law: 'A robot must protect its own existence, as long as such protection does not
conflict with the First or Second Law."'
ISAAC ASIMOv, FOUNDATION AND EARTH 484-85 (Bantam Dell 2004) [hereinafter FOUNDATION

AND EARTH]. The character Gregory Powell explained the hierarchical function of the Three Laws
in the short story Runaround,stating:
"The conflict between the various rules is ironed out by the different positronic
potentials in the brain. We'll say that a robot is walking into danger and knows it. The
automatic potential that Rule 3 sets up turns him back. But suppose you order him to
walk into that danger. In that case, Rule 2 sets up a counterpotential higher than the
previous one and the robot follows orders at the risk of existence.
According to Rule 1,a robot can't see a human come to harm because of his own
inaction. Two and 3 can't stand against it."
I, ROBOT, supra note 1, at 37, 42.
3. See I, ROBOT, supra note 1, at 37.
4. Id. at ix-x, 37; see also FOUNDATION AND EARTH, supranote 2, at 485.
5. Cf I, ROBOT, supra note 1, at 42. Asimov's robots were typically slaves to their human
creators. See Aaron Saenz, The Myth of the Three Laws of Robotics - Why We Can't Control
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novelty, and literary purposes-are ill suited for the contemporary

military reality, and are generally regarded as an inadequate basis for
machine ethics.6
Autonomous weapon systems ("AWS"), still in their technological
infancy, 7 have recently come under heavy fire from non-government
organizations ("NGOs," singularly "NGO") and various experts who
oppose the research, development, and eventual deployment of such
weapon systems in armed conflicts.' Specifically, Human Rights Watch

("HRW"), 9 in conjunction with Harvard Law School's International
Human Rights Clinic ("IHRC"), 10 published Losing Humanity. The Case
Against Killer Robots ("Losing Humanity," or "Report") on November
19, 2012.11 The Report contends that autonomous weapons-which do
not yet exist-will be incompatible with principles of the Law of Armed
Conflict ("LOAC")12 including distinction, proportionality, military
necessity, and the Martens Clause ("Martens Clause," or "Clause");
therefore, the Report concludes, AWS should be preemptively banned.13
On November 21, 2012, only three days after the publication of
Losing Humanity, the U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") released

Intelligence, SINGULARITY HUB (May 10, 2011, 8:10 AM), http://www.singularityhub.com/
(describing
2011/05/1 0/the-myth-of-the-three-laws-of-robotics-why-we-cant-control-intelligence/
Asimov's fictional robots as "a slave race") [hereinafter Saenz, Myth of Three Laws).
6. RONALD ARKN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 48 (2009);
see also Saenz, Myth of Three Laws, supranote 5.
7. Benjamin Wittes, Does Human Rights Watch Prefer Disproportionateand Indiscriminate
Humans to Discriminating and ProportionateRobots?, LAWFARE (Dec. 1, 2012, 10:19 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com
r202/12/does-human-rights-watch-prefer-disproportionate-andindiscriminate-humans-to-discriminating-and-proportionate-robots
8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH.,
LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 1-2, 5 (2012), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/armsl 12ForUploadOO.pdf [hereinafter LOSING
HUMANITY].
9. Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and InternationalHumanitarianLaw:
A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 1 (Feb. 5, 2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-lIL-Final.pdf [hereinafter Schmitt,
Autonomous Weapon Systems]. HRW is a sophisticated NGO which operates in the field of
international humanitarian law and human rights. Id.
10. See International Human Rights Clinic, HUM. RTS. PROGRAM, HARV. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/ihrc.html (last visited July 18, 2013). IRC, part of
Harvard Law School's Human Rights Program, promotes human rights and related law. Id.
11. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8; Arms: New Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/23/arms-new-campaign-stop-

killer-robots.
12. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, What Is InternationalHumanitarian Law? (2004),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what-is-ihlpdf" The LOAC, interchangeably
known as the Law of War and International Humanitarian Law, is part of the larger body of
international law and governs the actions of belligerents in armed conflicts. Id.
13. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 30-36.
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Directive Number 3000.09 on Autonomy in Weapon Systems
("Directive"), which establishes in detail DoD policy for the
development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon
systems.' 4 The Directive characterizes the technical distinction between
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, declares when
human supervision of such systems will be required, and outlines DoD
procedure for the development, review, acquisition, and use of
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems alike. 5
AWS will ultimately be investigated and developed by states
because advances in technology have historically been a major factor in
determining the outcomes of wars. 16 Such weapon systems, once
developed, may offer more than an offensive military advantage: AWS
17
may also be more compliant with the LOAC than human combatants.
Stated differently, AWS may be a superior offensive means of delivering
force, and a more humane means of doing So.18
Before addressing the premature claims of AWS' opponents, the
state of the technology should be made explicit: truly autonomous
weapons do not yet exist.' 9 Critics of these weapons argue that future
robotics technologies, which cannot be predicted with accuracy, will fail
to comply with LOAC principles.2 0 These allegations are, at best, based
"on unfounded assumptions as to the nature of [future autonomous
weapon] systems.,'2 That there is no factual basis to examine nonexistent technologies, the determination that such technologies will not
14. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09: AUTONOMY INWEAPONS SYSTEMS 1-2
(2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf [hereinafter
DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09].
15. See id. at 1-3.
16. See David Bell, In Defense of Drones:A HistoricalArgument, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 27,
2012),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/1001 13/obama-military-foreign-policytechnology-drones; see also ARKIN, supra note 6, at 29 ("The trend is clear: Warfare will continue
and autonomous robots will ultimately be deployed in its conduct."); Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey
S. Thumher, "Out of the Loop ":Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4
HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 231, 279 (2013) ("Autonomous technology is poised to revolutionize warfare.
Nations will undoubtedly clamor for the weapon systems that this technology will make possible.").
17. ARKIN, supra note 6, at 29-30.
18. See id at 29; see also Wittes, supra note 7 ("To call for a per se ban on autonomous
weapons is to insist as a matter of [international law] on preserving a minimum level of human error
in targeting.").
19. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 16, at 234 ("[N]o [autonomous] weapons have even left
the drawing board.").
20. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 1-4; Kenneth Anderson, Autonomous Weapon
Systems and Their Regulation - A Flurry of Activity, VOLOKH (Dec. 12, 2012, 9:32 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/12/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-their-regulation-a-flurry-ofactivity; Noel Sharkey, America's Mindless Killer Robots Must Be Stopped, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3,
2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/03/mindless-killer-robots.
21. Schmitt & Thumher, supra note 16, at 234.
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be capable of adhering to the LOAC should be precluded, especially
because such determinations often require a case-by-case analysis of
factors.22 However, the speculative nature of predicting future
technologies has not deterred HRW or its allies from initiating a witchhunt against AWS. 23
There are portions of the LOAC that may be interpreted as
providing a basis for banning a non-existent weapon. 4 The Martens
Clause, when viewed as elevating the principles of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience to the level of independent sources of
international law, would not require an analysis of the weapon's effects
or the circumstances of its use in the same manner as would the
traditional principles of the LOAC.2 5 Under this view of the Martens
Clause, it would be sufficient to proclaim a new weapon illegal under
international law if the principles of humanity or the dictates of the
public conscience were violated.26 It is therefore the objective of this
Note to explore the meaning of the Martens Clause, to address its
implications on the burgeoning efforts to research and develop AWS,
and to examine whether the Clause can be used to impose a preemptive
prohibition on such weapons.
Part II will provide background on AWS and semi-autonomous
systems, their existing precursors, and a brief overview of the possible
evolution of related technologies. 27 Part II.A will define the terms used
in this Note as well as those used in the reports, directives, and articles
used in support.28 Part II.A will also make explicit the difference
between autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, as well as
in-the-loop, on-the-loop, and out-of-the-loop distinctions, with regard to
where the human operator stands in relation to the weapon system.29 Part
II.B will establish a concise history of military robotics, and discuss
certain semi-autonomous and automatic weapon systems that can be

22. See, e.g., id.at 254 (explaining that whether a principle of LOAC has been violated is "the
product of a case-by-case assessment that is evaluated in terms of its reasonableness given the
attendant circumstances").
23.

See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 46-47; About Us, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER

ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/about-us (last visited July 18, 2013).
24. See Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: HalfaLoaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 187, 188-92 (2000).
25.

See LOSING HuMANITY, supranote 8, at 30-36.

26. Id. at 25-26 ("[E]ven if a means of war does not violate an existing treaty or customary
law, it can still be found unlawful if it contravenes the principles of humanity or the dictates of
public conscience.").
27. See infra Part I1.
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part l.A.
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viewed as forerunners of truly autonomous weapons.30 Part II.C will
discuss the future of AWS as outlined in official policy documents of the
United States, and will explore the anticipated benefits of such weapons
in terms of military and humanitarian usefulness. 3' Part II.C will
additionally cover the technological advances that will be necessary to
achieve true autonomy in weapons.3 2
The focus of Part III is to examine the arguments supporting a
preemptive ban of AWS through the lens of international law, and to
compare HRW's urged ban of AWS with existing prohibitions and
restrictions of other weapons.33 Part III.A will analyze Losing Humanity,
a recent and prominent effort to prohibit AWS before they can be
developed.3 4 Part III.B will briefly explain relevant portions of the
LOAC and its sources, and provide a historical overview of the Martens
Clause.35 Part III.C will discuss the prohibition of blinding laser
weapons and other arms control agreements, and will analyze the role
that the Martens Clause played in their accomplishment. 36 Lastly, Part
III.D will scrutinize the Martens Clause in the context of a preemptive
prohibition on the use and development of AWS.37
Part IV will explore the likelihood of the Martens Clause
contributing to a prohibition on AWS, as well as the positions that
interested states should take in opposing such a prohibition.38 Part IV.A
will reexamine the interpretations of the Clause, and classify the Clause
into three "benchmark" categories for evaluation.39 After finding that a
broad interpretation of the Clause poses the most significant and
imminent risk to AWS, Part IV.B-C will survey and suggest various
steps that interested states should take in order to protect themselves
against opponents of AWS. 40 Additionally, Part LV.D will address the
unprecedented nature of banning a weapon that has not yet been
invented, let alone fielded in combat.4 '
Finally, Part V will draw conclusions about the impact the Martens
Clause may have on AWS, the likelihood of its success in forging a

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part 11.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra PartlV.
See infra Part W.A.
See infra Part IV.B-C.
See infra Part N.D.
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prohibition, and the decisions that interested states will have to navigate
in the near future.42
II.

THE BACKGROUND AND TECHNOLOGIES OF
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS

'[4] robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except
where such orders would conflict with the FirstLaw.'
43
- Isaac Asimov, The Second Law of Robotics
A.

Definitions

For the purpose of this Note, a weapon is defined as a device,
implement, munition, substance, object, or piece of equipment that is
capable of directing an offensive force toward a combatant or military
objective. 4 The means of warfare, accordingly, refers to "all weapons,
weapons platforms, and associated equipment used directly to deliver
force during hostilities. 'A 5 Lastly, the term "[m]ethods of warfare" is
46
defined as the application of such weapons in an armed conflict.
Robots are defined herein as machines that operate with some degree of
autonomy and have the ability to sense and act in an environment
according to their programming. 47 In the context of military application
in armed conflicts, this Note regards robots as weapons or weapon
systems, not soldiers or other actors in hostilities.
In addition, for the purposes of this discussion, the distinction
between tiers of autonomy should be clarified. HRW and IHRC, in the
recent Report calling for the prohibition of "killer robots" that
autonomously target and kill,48 define the levels of lethal autonomy as
"Human-in-the-loop Weapons," "Human-on-the-loop Weapons," and
"Human-out-of-the-loop Weapons. ' 49 Human-in-the-loop Weapons, as
described by the Report, are "[r]obots that can select targets and deliver
force only with a human command.. ,50 This definition denotes semi-

42. See infra Part V.
43. I, ROBOT, supranote 1, at 37.
WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4 (2009).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 2.
48. Id.at 1. The HRW Report has been described as "a quasi-brief intended to justify a
sweeping call for a preemptive, prohibitory multilateral treaty that would ban the 'development,
production, and use' of autonomous weapons systems." Anderson, supra note 20 (quoting LOSING
HUMANITY,supra note 8, at 5).
49. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 2.
50. Id.

44. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY,
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autonomous capabilities in that the robot may perform some tasks
without human intervention but still requires a human operator to
acquire a target or strike. 51 The Report defines Human-on-the-Loop
Weapons as "[r]obots that can select targets and deliver force under the
oversight of a human operator who can override the robots'
actions .... ,52 Such a robot would be autonomous, as it does not require
human interference or assistance to act.53 Lastly, Human-out-of-theLoop Weapons are defined by the Report as "[r]obots that are capable of
selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or
interaction. ' 54 Such robots could be considered the most autonomous, as
they are capable of acting-indeed, killing-entirely on their own.5 5
These classifications, carefully chosen by the Report, are more
concerned with the implementation of military robots and where the
human operator sits within or upon the chain of5 6command, rather than
the attributes or capabilities of the machine itself.
Although the Report defines Human-in-the-loop Weapons as semiautonomous, being unable to "select targets and deliver force" without
human intervention,57 this definition excludes a sizeable gray area in
which a semi-autonomous weapon may select, acquire, or affirm the
target autonomously but not strike autonomously, or, in the reverse,
where the target may be preselected by a human operator and the
weapon determines or implements the force that is issued. 58 The DoD, in
its Directive addressing autonomy in weapons systems, defined the term
"semi-autonomous weapon system" as a system which, "once activated,
is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups
that have been selected by a human operator." 59 Such systems include:
Semi-autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for
engagement-related functions including, but not limited to, acquiring,
tracking, and identifying potential targets; cueing potential targets to
human operators; prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire;
or providing terminal guidance to home in on selected targets,

51.
52.
weapon
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
Id. The DoD, in the Directive, refers to such systems as "human-supervised autonomous
systems." DIRECTIVENO. 3000.09,supranote 14, at 13-14.
See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 2.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id; DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supra note 14, at 14.
DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, supra note 14, at 14.
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provided that human control is retained over the decision to select
individual targets and specific target groups for engagement. 60

Within this Note, the lethality of a robotic weapon system is defined as
semi-autonomous
when the
weapon-otherwise
capable
of
autonomously carrying out its task-requires a human operator for either
target acquisition or target engagement, or both.6'
The Report, in defining Human-on-the-loop and Human-out-of-theloop Weapons alike as fully autonomous, is generally in accord with the
DoD definition of an AWS, despite the shortcomings of the Report's
definitions.6 2 It should be noted, however, that the DoD has stated that

fully autonomous weapon systems have, at this time, only been
authorized "for local defense" of manned installations and platforms,
and are operated under the supervision of a human operator (Human-onthe-loop). 63 Furthermore, these AWS may only select non-human
targets.64 For the purpose of this Note, a fully autonomous weapon
system is that which can select, acquire, or affirm its target and engage
this target without human intervention.6 5
B. A BriefHistory of Modern MilitaryRobotics

Humans have always engaged in armed conflict, and this reality has
often led to heated competition between states for supremacy and
invention in "the arts and the instruments of force. 66 Presently, robotic
weapon systems are also employed with levels of automation such that
the human operator can assume a posture of observation, rather than
control every action of the robotic system.67 Examples of highly
automated, human-supervised weapon systems include the Phalanx anti60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 2; DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supra note 14, at 14.
The DoD defines an autonomous weapon system as a system that, "once activated, can select and
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator," whether a human operator retains
a supervisory override capability or not. DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supra note 14, at 13-14.
63. DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supranote 14, at 3.
64. Id.However, non-lethal autonomous weapons that pass the rigorous testing outlined in the
Directive may select and engage targets for non-kinetic, i.e., electronic, attacks. Id.
65. See id. at 13-14.
66.

KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 127 (1979) ("The fate of

each state depends on its responses to what other states do. The possibility that conflict will be
conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and the instruments of force.... Contending
states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and
ingenuity."); Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 409, 411 (2009);
see also Aaron Saenz, War 2.0 - Rise of the Robots, SINGULARITY HUB (June 1, 2009, 12:17 PM),
http://www.singularityhub.com/2009/06/0 l/war-20-rise-of-the-robots [hereinafter Saenz, War 2.0].
67. Saenz, War 2.0, supranote 66.
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ship defense system, the Patriot anti-aircraft missile batteries, the
Counter-Rocket, Artillery
and Missile ("C-RAM") system, and the
68
robot.
sentry
SGR-A1
The Phalanx system provides anti-ship missile defense to various
naval vessels by fully automatically conducting the functions of
searching, detecting, threat evaluating, target acquisitioning, tracking,
and firing. 69 The Phalanx automatically determines whether an
approaching target is a threat or a non-threat by70comparing the trajectory
of the target against the software's threat logic.
On land, the C-RAM provides defense in hostile territories through
automated turret intervention against surprise ballistic attacks. 7' The CRAM detects, tracks, targets, and eliminates incoming ballistics "faster
than a human could even begin to command it to fire. 72 The human's
role in the operation of the C-RAM system is relegated to that of
maintenance: the operator merely turns on and off the turret.73 This
human-machine relationship, which relies almost entirely on the robot, is
by design: The C-RAM is meant to respond to threats that human beings
simply are not fast enough to handle.74
The SGR-Al is a semi-autonomous sentry robot that scans the
demilitarized zone ("DMZ") dividing North Korea and South Korea, and
which is capable of identifying targets, issuing commands to surrender,
observing signs of surrender, and responding appropriately. 75 The SGRAl can also attack its target without direct human control when it has
been set to operate automatically. 76 It is important to note that the SGRAl merely identifies every target that enters the DMZ as an enemy by
virtue of the person or object having entered the prohibited zone.77

68. See Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots,
12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 272, 276 (2011); Saenz, War 2.0, supra note 66; Jean Kumagai, A
Robotic Sentry for Korea's Demilitarized Zone, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 2007),
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/military-robots/a-robotic-sentry-for-koreas-demilitarizedzone.
69. M.S. Frick, RAM and Phalanx: System of Systems Testing, NAVY LEAGUE,
http://www.navyleague.org/seapower/sept00/frick.htm (last visited July 18, 2013).
70. Robert H. Stoner, R2D2 with Attitude: The Story of the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
(CIWS), NAVWEAPs, http://www.navweaps.com/indextech/tech-103.htm (last updated Oct. 30,
2009).
71. Saenz, War 2.0, supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Samsung Techwin SGR-Al
Sentry Guard Robot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/sgr-al .htm (last visited July 18, 2013).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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These semi-autonomous and automated weapon systems, when
viewed as forerunners of AWS, provide examples of certain beneficial
purposes for which AWS may be used in the future: such systems
will be useful, if not crucial, in roles where speed is necessitated,
unwavering persistence is required, and human soldiers simply cannot
get the job done.7 8
C. The Future ofAutonomous Weapon Systems
Though the technology necessary to achieve full autonomy in
weapon systems is not yet viable, the benefits of such systems has
already become an area of interest in many military and robotics
communities, and the United States has indicated its interest in
developing such weapons in various military policy documents.79
1. U.S. Policy Documents Regarding Autonomy in
Future Weapon Systems
Military policy documents and directives issued by the United
States have already laid the groundwork for increased deployment of
unmanned systems and reflect plans to gradually increase the autonomy
of weapon systems.80 Some military and robotics experts have predicted
that the technology required to establish truly autonomous weapons
could be available within a few decades.8' Werner J.A. Dahm, Chief
Scientist of the U.S. Air Force ("USAF"), stated in a 2010 report that,
"by 2030 machine capabilities will have increased to the point that
humans will have become the weakest component in a wide array of
systems and processes. 82 Recently, the United States became the first
nation to release an official policy statement on the development of
AWS-the Directive-in which the protocols for designing, testing, and
fielding such systems are outlined.8 3

78. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74; see also P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE
ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 63-64 (2009).

Additionally, robots are ideal candidates to undertake tasks that are dirty, dull, and dangerous.
SINGER, supra,at 63.
79. See infra Part ll.C.1-3.
80.

LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 7.

81.

Id.at 8.

82. U.S. AIR FORCE CHIEF SCIENTIST (AF/ST), REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY HORIZONS: A
VISION FOR AIR FORCE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DURING 2010-2030, at x (2010), available at

http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100727-053.pdf.
83. See DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supra note 14, at 1-4 (outlining U.S. policy for the
development and implementation of AWS); see also Mark Gubrud, DoD Directive on Autonomy in
Weapon Systems, INT'L COMM. FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.icrac.net/
2012/11/dod-directive-on-autonomy-in-weapon-systems.
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The USAF Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan ("Flight Plan")
envisions "a family of unmanned aircraft," drastically ranging in size
and function, all of which will include autonomous capabilities.84 The
USAF seeks to "harness increasingly automated, modular, globally
connected, and sustainable multi-mission unmanned systems ....
,,85
in
the short-term, the USAF plans to incorporate autonomy for functions
such as takeoff and landing,
flight, swarming, and carrying out non86
lethal mission operations.
The Flight Plan acknowledges that "[a]dvances in computing
speeds and capacity will change how technology affects the [Observe,
Orient, Decide, and Act] loop.,, 87 As a result, "humans will no longer be
'in the loop' but rather 'on the loop' - monitoring the execution of
certain decisions. Simultaneously, advances in [artificial intelligence]
will enable systems to make combat decisions and act within legal and
policy constraints without necessarily requiring human input." 88 Noting
that the implementation of lethal AWS in the battlefield "is contingent
upon political and military... resol[ution of] legal and ethical
questions, 89 the Flight Plan's long-term vision culminates with fully
autonomous technology. 90 The weapon systems envisioned may be
capable of autonomous target engagement, resulting in "a revolution in
9' Similar modernization programs
the roles of humans in air warfare."
92
are underway in the U.S. Army.

84. U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047, at 3 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 3, 33. It is anticipated that swarming weapon systems will be capable of
synchronized flight and attack, either autonomously or semi-autonomously. See id at 16.
87. Id. at 41. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act ("OODA") loop is a continuous process
by which a machine observes and analyzes information, makes decisions, and acts upon such
decisions. Id.By 2047, "technology will be able to reduce the time to complete the OODA loop to
micro or nanoseconds ..."Id
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 50.
91. Id.
92.

ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS

WEAPONS 71 (2009).
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2. The Benefits of Autonomous Weapons
It has been posited by military and robotics experts that AWS may
be an improvement over human soldiers in a variety of areas crucial to
both military effectiveness and humanitarian concerns. 93 Ronald C.
Arkin has stated that, "[i]n the fog of war it is hard enough for a human
to be able to effectively discriminate whether or not a target is
legitimate. Fortunately, it may be anticipated... that in the future
autonomous robots may be able to perform better than humans under
these conditions .... ",94
Some of the ethical advantages AWS will have over human soldiers
may include: the ability to act more conservatively than their human
counterparts due to the autonomous system's lack of motivation for selfpreservation; 9' the programming to behave in a self-sacrificing manner,
if necessary, due to the absence of fear of death; 96 the ability to act
without emotions, making autonomous systems insusceptible to anger
or fear on the battlefield and therefore able to exercise clearer
judgment than humans; 97 and immunity from psychological "scenario
fulfillment," which occurs "where humans use new incoming
information in ways that only fit their pre-existing belief patterns," and
can result in "distortion
or neglect of contradictory information in
98
situations.,
stressful
Arkin cites a report by the Mental Health Advisory Team
("MHAT") that assesses the ethics and mental health of soldiers who
had been deployed in Iraq and notes that the effects of battle on their
psyches are alarming. 99 The MHAT report found that "[t]he level of
combat is the main determinant of a Soldier's or Marine's mental health
status" and that "[d]eployment length was related to higher rates of
mental health problems. . ,,.00 Additionally, AWS may present
numerous operational benefits to the military, including: "Faster,
cheaper, better mission accomplishment; longer range, greater
persistence, longer endurance, higher precision; faster target

93. See, e.g., ARKIN, supranote 6, at 29-31.
94. Id. at 29.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 29-30.
98. Id. at 30.
99. Id. at 31-32.
100. MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM (MHAT) IV, FINAL REPORT: OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM 05-07, at 3 (2006), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/551721/mental-health-advisory-team-mhat-iv.pdf. This report also found that soldiers
who experienced high levels of combat were nearly twice as likely to mistreat non-combatants as
those who had experienced low levels of combat. Id. at 4.
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engagement; and immunity to chemical and biological weapons among
others." ° Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Chairman of the Defense Science
Board, succinctly stated the purpose of pursuing AWS: "The true value
of these systems is not to provide a direct human replacement, but10rather
2
to extend and complement human capability in a number of ways."
3. Technologies Required for True Autonomy
Critics and proponents of AWS debate whether technology will
evolve to such a degree that fully autonomous weapon systems may be
viable, effective, and compliant with the LOAC and international human
rights concerns.10 3 Despite the disjointed views about what the
capabilities of currently non-existent future technologies will be, it is
apparent that the "incremental march" towards the development and use
of AWS is already underway. 104 Furthermore, serious questions loom
over the fate of artificial intelligence ("Al"), the future state of which
has been "overpromised" in the past.10 5 Critics of AWS also assert that,
aside from LOAC constraints, machine programming will never "replace
the key elements of human emotion and affect that make human beings
irreplaceable in making lethal decisions on the battlefield ....
, While
those who oppose a preemptive ban of AWS admit that Al may never
progress to such a level as to meet the requirements of the LOAC, it is
hardly an established fact that human emotion is an irreplaceable, let
alone safer, trait for decision-making on the battlefield." 7

101. ARKIN, supra note 6, at 30 (citation omitted).
102. DEF. SCI. BD., DEP'T OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD
SYSTEMS 1 (2012), availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.
103. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Human Rights Watch Report on Killer Robots,
and Our Critique, LAWFARE (Nov. 26, 2012, 8:33 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/1 I/
human-rights-watch-report-on-killer-robots-and-our-critique [hereinafter Anderson & Waxman,
Human Rights Watch Report].
104. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon
Systems: Why a Ban Won 't Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INSTITUTION, Apr. 9,
2013, at 4-6, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/144241 [hereinafter
Anderson & Waxman, Law andEthics]. In fact, Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman conclude
that "[tihe incremental... deployment of autonomous weapon systems is inevitable ....
"Id. at 27.
105. Id. at 14; cf Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supra note 9, at 17 ("After all,
artificial intelligence is artificial.").
106. Anderson & Waxman, Law and Ethics, supranote 104, at 14-15.
107. Id.(explaining that AWS, compared to human soldiers, may "reduce risks to civilians" in
the future); see also supra text accompanying notes 93-104.
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III.

THE ARGUMENT FOR BANNING AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS,
A REVIEW OF PAST WEAPONS PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS, AND
THE MARTENS CLAUSE

'[A] robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection
does not conflict with the Firstor Second Laws.'
- Isaac Asimov, The Third Law of Robotics 0 8
New technologies have continuously produced increasingly
complex means and methods of doing combat, 0 9 and there is little

historical precedent for prohibiting new weapons before they have been
fielded, let alone invented-yet, that is precisely what Losing Humanity
seeks to accomplish."0
A. The Debate Against Autonomous Weapons
A recent debate has emerged surrounding AWS, and the critics
have decried the inevitable failure of AWS to comply with LOAC
principles."' These critics, most notably HRW, urge the preemptive ban
on related research, development, and testing of lethal autonomous
systems."12 Most recently, the United Nations has joined the debate over

AWS, concluding in an annual report ("U.N. Report") that autonomous
weapons should be approached with "great caution" and recommending
108. I, ROBOT, supra note 1, at 37,
109. Beard, supra note 66, at 411.
110. LOSING HuMANITY, supra note 8, at 5; Michael N, Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The
US. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed
Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1051-1052 (1998) [hereinafter Schmitt, Bellum Americanum].
The only weapons in modem history to have been banned before they were fielded in battle are
blinding laser weapons, which were prohibited after they were viable but before they were
implemented in combat. Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, openedfor signature Oct. 13, 1995, 2024
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Protocol IV]; Schmitt, Bellum Americanum, supra, at 1051-52.
111. See generally LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8 (arguing that AWS will be unable to
comply with LOAC tenets of distinction, proportion, military necessity, and the Martens Clause).
112. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 5; Tom Malinowski, Op-Ed., A Dangerous
Future of Killer Robots, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2012, at A23; Berlin Statement, INT'L COMM. FOR
ROBOT ARMS CONTROL, http://www.icrac.net/statements (last visited July 18, 2013) (urging the
prohibition of "[flurther development, acquisition, deployment, and use of armed autonomous robot
weapons"); Sharkey, supra note 20 ("It is clear that the rational approach to the inhumanity of
automating death by machine is to prohibit it."). In April of 2013, HRW spearheaded the Campaign
to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of international NGOs established to further its crusade against
AWS. About Us, supra note 23. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was recently described by
Greg McNeal as a "fear campaign" that uses "scare tactics to simplify and amplify messages ......
Greg McNeal, Fear and the Killer Robots Meme, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013, 6:59 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2013/02/27/fear-and-the-killer-robots-meme.
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a moratorium on the development of AWS. 13 The U.N. Report, unlike
Losing Humanity, seeks to establish an international body "to monitor
the situation and articulate the options for the longer term," rather than
demanding a preemptive prohibition of AWS outright."14
Losing Humanity urges all nations to "[p]rohibit the development,

production, and use of fully-autonomous weapons through an
international legally binding instrument" and to "[a]dopt national laws
and policies to prohibit the development, production, and use of fully
autonomous weapons."' 5 The HRW and IHRC Report does not only
avail itself of states, but also tasks roboticists and specialists with
"[e]stablish[ing] a professional code of conduct governing the research
and development of autonomous robotic weapons... to ensure that
legal and ethical concerns about their use in armed conflict are
adequately considered ....
On its most basic level, the Report espouses a "Frankensteinian
fantasy""' that "killer robots" will be uncontrollable, kill civilians, and,
in the hands of a "repressive dictator," be used to hunt down innocent
citizens.118 The Report claims that AWS, when viable, will fail to
comply with the LOAC. 19 The Report alleges that the future
technologies that will enable AWS will fail to meet the requirements of
distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and the Martens
Clause. 20 While there is some overlap between these principles, the
focus of this Note is on the Martens Clause and its twin pillars.

113. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report on Lethal
Autonomous Robots, Human Rights Council, M 1, 109, 113, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9,
2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter U.N. Report].
114. Compare id. at
112 (recommending the establishment of an international body to
oversee the development of AWS), with LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 5 (recommending that
all nations "[p]rohibit the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons through
an international legally binding instrument").
115. LOSING HUMANITY, supranote 8, at 5.
116. Id.
117. Brad Allenby, What Human Rights Watch's "Case Against Killer Robots" Gets Wrong
About Military Realities, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
futuretense/2012/11/20/human rights watch_s_case_against killer robotsreport misunderstands
_the.html ("The fundamental problem with [HRW's] report... is its adoption of the Frankenstein
worldview. The 'humans vs. technology' myth is quite powerful, especially in Westem cultures, and
always popular with audiences. But it is just too flawed and oversimplistic a foundation on which to
build policy formulation."); see also McNeal, supranote 112 (identifying the rhetoric of HRW and
its Report as a "fear campaign" aimed at rousing public horror).
118. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 3-4, 46.
119. Id.at30-36.
120. Id.
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The Law ofArmed Conflict and the Martens Clause

The LOAC is part of the broader body of public international
law, 121 the primary sources of which are customary law and
multinational treaties.
Other sources of authority specifically
impacting Weapons Law are arms control agreements; although not
always sources of international law, and not necessarily governed by
international law, arms control agreements may also provide a legal
123
basis for restricting or prohibiting the use of certain weapons.
Customary international law arises from the consenting conduct and
practices of nations who engage in armed conflicts, with the caveat that
the nation-actors must believe that their conduct and practices arise from
legal requirements. 124 When determining the behavior and beliefs of
nations for the purpose of establishing customary norms, numerous
material sources of varying weightiness are consulted. 25 A treaty is "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation ....
,,26 Treaties are generally only binding upon the nations
who are parties
to the document and have consented to its terms
12
as written.

1

The Martens Clause was originally recorded in the 1899 Hague
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
("Hague Convention II").128 The Clause was then reformulated and

121.

BOOTHBY, supra note 44, at 22.

122. Id. at 23.
123. See id. at 23, 29-30. Arms control agreements are agreed to by, and enforceable against,
participating states, and are generally created to prohibit or restrict specific weapons or munitions
research, production, design, or use. See id; see generally Thomas Axworthy & Ryan Dean, A Scan
of Existing Arms Control Agreements with Lessons Learned, INTERACTION COUNCIL (May 29-31,
2011),
http://www.interactioncouncil.org/scan-existing-arms-control-treaties-lessons-ieamed
(reviewing various arms control agreements).
124. BOOTHBY, supranote 44, at 23-25.
125. Id.at 27. These sources may include official policy statements and press releases, the
opinions of legal advisors, legal manuals including manuals of military law and orders to armed
forces, executive decisions and practices, international and national judicial decisions, treaties
ratified by the state in question, and the practices of international organs. Id.
126. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
127. BOOTHBY, supra note 44, at 28. Treaty obligations can at times give rise to customary
norms that exist separately and concurrently to the treaty provisions themselves. See id.at 27.
128. Opened for signature July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1805. The Martens Clause, as
originally recorded, stated:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
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included in the 1907 Preamble to Convention IV with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land ("Hague Convention V").

129

The

Hague Convention IV formulation of the Martens Clause states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, 13
from
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
0
public conscience.

The Martens Clause was originally intended to preserve the
customary rules that were in effect before the codification of the Hague
Conventions and which were not named in those treaties."' The precise
current meaning of the Martens Clause and its impact on the LOAC is
debated, and its interpretations are varied.1 32 The narrowest reading of
the Martens Clause stands for the proposition that pre-existing
33
customary law norms are not proscribed by positive treaty provisions.
The broadest interpretation of the Clause is that actors in an armed

principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience ....
Id. at 1805.
129. Opened for signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279-80 [hereinafter Hague
Convention IV].
130. Id. The Martens Clause was subsequently incorporated into Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, openedfor signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1]. The Clause, as expressed in
Additional Protocol I, states that, "[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience." Id.
131. Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principlesof Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79-80 (2000). Meron also explains that the modernized version
of the Clause, recorded in Additional Protocol I, serves a similar purpose:
The Geneva Conventions employ a version of the Martens clause . .. for a
somewhat different, but parallel, goal: to make clear that if they denounce the
Conventions, the parties will remain bound by the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of public conscience. This provision thus guarantees that international
customary law will still apply for states no longer bound by the Geneva Conventions as
treaty law.
Id. at 80.
132. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 125, 126 (1997).
133. Id.
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conflict are bound not only by customary norms and treaty law, but34also

by principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience. 1

At the very least, in the years since its introduction, the Clause has
been frequently cited 135 and generally understood as extending to the
entirety of the LOAC.13 6 In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons ("Nuclear Weapons"),137 the International Court of Justice

("ICJ") observed that the Martens Clause, and the fundamental rules it
incorporates, is "to be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they
constitute
138

intransgressible principles of international customary law.'
1. The Principles
Public Conscience

of Humanity

and the Dictates

of the

In Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ found that the Martens Clause "has
proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of
military technology"'139 by preserving customary principles of humanity

embodied in the Martens Clause, including the principles of distinction
4
and proportionality, 40 the prohibition against unnecessary suffering,1 '
and the premise that the means of warfare are not unlimited. 42 The

principles of humanity, however, are already norms of customary
international law, codified in treaties, or both-therefore, the traditional

134. Id.
135. Meron, supra note 131, at 78-79. Meron notes that:
[T]he Martens clause has been relied upon in the Nuremberg jurisprudence, addressed by
the International Court of Justice and human rights bodies, and reiterated in many
humanitarian law treaties that regulate the means and methods of warfare. It was restated
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, the 1977
Additional Protocols to those Conventions, and the Preamble to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, albeit in
slightly different versions. The Martens clause ... is cited or otherwise referred to in
several national military manuals, including those of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Germany.
Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
136. Id. at 79.
137. Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
138. Id. at 257.
139. Id. The ICJ's statement on the effectiveness of the Clause actually does little to clarify its
exact meaning, and the judges of the ICJ themselves could not agree on a singular interpretation of
the Clause. See Ticehurst, supranote 132, at 127-28.
140. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supra note 9, at 14-15, 18. Distinction and the
prohibition against weapons which are absolutely incapable of discrimination are different, but
related, principles. Id.at 10.
141. Id. at 8-9.
142. Additional Protocol I, supranote 129, at 21.
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interpretation of
this prong of the Clause does not represent any original
143
AWS.
to
threat
There is no singular meaning of the dictates of the public
conscience. 144 Theodor Meron explains that this phrase can be examined
from two distinct perspectives: first, "as public opinion that shapes the
conduct of the parties to a conflict and promotes the development of

intemational humanitarian law, including customary law"; and second,

"4as a reflection of opinio juris.' 45 Meron distinguishes the two
perspectives in that public opinion has the power to promote the growth

of customary law by persuading a government to regard "certain
developing norms as already declaratory of customary law,"'146 whereas
opinio juris is the belief of states and their authoritative figures that a
particular practice is obligatory, or accepted as law-a predicate to the
formation of customary norms. 47 Although public opinion and opinio
juris are separate concepts, they are linked in that popular opinion often

influences and induces government opinion.148 Furthermore, Dan Belz
has observed that public opinion also imposes "audience costs" on states
as punishment for violations of international humanitarian law. 49
Therefore, nations may be incentivized to comply with humanitarian law
in order "to win the support of public opinion," avoid backlash in
domestic elections, and avoid aggravating the civilian population who
reside where the fighting occurs.1 50

143. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 257; see, e.g., Additional
Protocol I, supra note 129, at 21-22 (prohibiting the use of "weapons ... and methods of warfare of
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering" and mandating the distinction
between military targets and nontargets). The principles of humanity have, however, "been invoked
rhetorically in attempts to humanize the behavior of parties using certain methods of warfare."
Meron, supra note 131, at 84. Furthermore, some states have argued that the principles of humanity
prong of the Clause could "transform" general principles of humanity into "prohibitions on
conduct," without such principles having "ascended" to the status of customary norms. Michelle A.
Hansen, Preventingthe Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of Human Rights Law into
Armed Conflict, Mu. L. REv., Winter 2007, at 1, 19. It should also be noted that, in regards to the
principles of humanity, some critics of AWS have suggested that "[t]aking humans out of the loop
also risks taking humanity out of the loop," but this author finds such arguments too literal to
roundly address. U.N. Report, supra note 113, at 89.
144. See Hansen, supra note 143, at 19-20; cf Meron, supra note 131, at 83-85.
145. Meron, supranote 131, at 83.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Dan Belz, Is InternationalHumanitarian Law Lapsing into Irrelevance in the War on
International Terror?, 7 THEORETICAL INQUmlES L. 97, 121 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
150. Id.
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2. Modem Interpretations of the Martens Clause
The modem meaning of the Martens Clause is the subject of debate
amongst judges, scholars, states, and NGOs.' 51 Antonio Cassese
identifies three interpretations of the Martens Clause yielded from
existing scholarship: the Clause helps to interpret existing principles and
rules of international law; the Clause has elevated the principles of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience to the status of
independent sources of international law; or the Clause has simply
influenced and motivated the development of international law
15 3
principles. 152 The Statute of the International Court of Justice
recognizes another principle, albeit without referring to the dictates of
the public conscience: "The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,
shall apply.., the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations . .,154
This interpretation offers a "public" composed only of
states-civilized ones, at that-and
therefore presents a relatively
155
conservative view of the Clause.
A nuanced variation of Cassese's second interpretation of the
Clause urges that the principles of humanity and the dictates of the
public conscience are independent sources of international law, but
would require the exact content of these sources to be determined by
courts of law in light of evolving circumstances.1 56 Such a view would
not immediately transform the principles of humanity and dictates of the
public conscience into hard legal standards, but would permit courts to
examine the acts of states (though, not necessarily acts which rise to the
level of customary norms) as an1 57additional basis for crystallizing these
principles into international law.'
The United States has subscribed to the view that the Martens
Clause merely clarifies the existence and applicability of customary
international law not explicitly addressed by the agreements contained in

151. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 26; Hansen, supranote 143, at 19-20. The debate
over the meaning of the Clause is illustrated by the varying opinions issued in Nuclear Weapons.
Compare Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
260 (July 8) (finding that the Martens Clause applies only "as an affirmation that the principles and
rules of humanitarian law apply to [newly created weapons]"), with id.
at 408-11 (Shahabuddeen, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Martens Clause is not "confined to supplying a humanitarian standard
by which to interpret separately existing rules of conventional or customary international law").
152. Cassese, supra note 24, at 189-92; accordTicehurst, supra note 132, at 126.
153. June26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1055.
154. Id. at 1060.
155. See Cassese, supra note 24, at 189-92.
156. Id. at 191.
157. Id.at 191-92.
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multinational conventions. 5 8 In practice, this interpretation of the
Martens Clause is the most widely accepted, as "no domestic or
international court has fleshed out the scope of these dictates as
independent sources of law, and the Martens Clause has never been
successfully invoked to preclude the use of a new weapon.' ' 159 In fact,
guided by such an interpretation, the Martens Clause alone would never
be sufficient to prohibit a new weapon. 60
On the other hand, there are humanitarian NGOs that espouse the
broadest view of the Martens Clause.1 61 The International Committee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC") has stated that "[a] weapon which is not
covered by existing rules of international humanitarian law would be
considered contrary to the Martens [C]lause if it is determined per se to
contravene the principles of humanity or the dictates of public
conscience. 1 62 HRW, maintaining a similar position, has noted that the
LOAC is shaped not only by reference to existing customary and treaty
law, but also by reference to the principles of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience. 63
The overwhelming majority of cases that have interpreted the
Martens Clause have used it in a supplemental fashion. 164 The Clause
has thus been generally cited to advance the idea that the principles of
humanity and dictates of the public conscience are supplemental sources
of international law used to bolster a finding that a practice contravenes
international law on another, more traditional or substantial legal
principle. 65 In such instances, therefore, the Martens Clause was
inessential because decisions were reached on other grounds. 166 These
supplemental, ad abundantiam uses of the Clause "primarily... pa[id]
158. See Hansen, supranote 143, at 19.
159. Lesley Wexler, Limiting the PrecautionaryPrinciple: Weapons Regulation in the Face of
Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 459,483 (2006); see Cassese, supranote 24, at 208.
160. See Cassese, supra note 24, at 189-92. If the Clause's dual prongs are not elevated to the
status of independent sources of international law, the Clause would necessarily have to attach to a
traditional source of law-such as a customary norm or treaty provision-to effectively invalidate a
new weapon. See id.
161. See, e.g., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons,
Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of
1977, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 931, 945 (2006), availableat http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/irrc 864 icrc geneva.pdf (adopting the broadest view of the Martens Clause).
162. Id.
163.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLINDING LASER WEAPONS: THE NEED TO BAN A CRUEL AND

INHUMANE WEAPON 31 (1995), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Generall.htm ("[T]he
Martens clause establishes that despite continuing developments in technology and methods of
warfare, the principles of custom, humanity, and public conscience always hold.").
164. Cassese, supra note 24, at 202.
165. Id. at 202-07.
166. Id.
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lip service to humanitarian demands, rather than... support[] the notion
that" principles of humanity and dictates of the public conscience are
independent, singly effective sources of international law. 167 The
persuasiveness of this view is buttressed by the fact that no international
or national court has ever held that a rule emerged from the principles of
humanity or the dictates of the public conscience, unlike other, more
traditional pillars of the LOAC. 168 Accordingly, a fair, but certainly not
the only, interpretation could view the Clause as establishing a
framework for interpreting international rules, rather than creating
them. 169 That is, courts can and should consider the principles of
humanity as well as the dictates of the public conscience, which, while
not determinative,
may serve as guidelines for evaluating the issue
0
them.17
before
C. Past Weapons Prohibitionsand the Martens Clause
In recent history, certain weapons have been prohibited or restricted
through the creation of multinational treaties. 171 One of the most
prominent of which is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects ("CCW")1 72 and
its annexed protocols.' 73 The weapons prohibited by the CCW are those
that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have injurious
effects, rather than those that have been deemed to have such effects,
evincing a careful avoidance of any determination that the weapons
addressed in the treaty were per se illegal before the treaty was put into
effect. 174 This raises the question of whether the prohibitions and

167. Id.at 208.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170.

Id.

171. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, openedfor signature June 17, 1925, 26
U.S.T.571 [hereinafter Geneva Gas Protocol] (prohibiting the use of gas and poisonous weapons in
armed conflicts).
172. Opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention on
Conventional Weapons].
173. See, e.g., Protocol IV, supra note 110, at 167.
174. BOOTHBY, supranote 44, at 115-16; W. Hayes Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 511, 518 (2006) [hereinafter Parks, Means and Methods]. Parks notes
that:
[H]ad the weapons in question been deemed by governments to be 'excessively injurious
or to have indiscriminate effects' per se ...their use already would be prohibited,
making new treaty provisions unnecessary. This indicates-subsequently confirmed by
conference results-that the conference and convention title were more political rhetoric
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based upon the LOAC,
restrictions created under the CCW are actually
17
1
agreements.
control
arms
or if they are merely
Of particular interest to this Note are the following three weapons
prohibitions: the Geneva Convention Protocol on the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare ("Geneva Gas Protocol"); 176 the
CCW's first Annexed Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments;17 7 and the
CCW's fourth Annexed Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons ("Protocol
IV"). 178 The Geneva Gas Protocol is of interest because the language
contained therein specifically contemplates the "general opinion of the
civilised world,' '17 9 whereas the CCW's first and fourth Protocols each
yielded the prohibition of non-existent weapons. 180
The Geneva Gas Protocol states:
WHEREAS the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly

condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world; and
To THE END that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a
part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice
of nations;
181
accept this prohibition ....
[Tihe High Contracting Parties ...

While the Geneva Gas Protocol is noted here for its inclusion of
notions of general opinion, as well as its mention of the conscience of
nations-implicating, if indirectly, the Martens Clause-the Geneva Gas
Protocol is essentially a reactive treaty addressing the effects of gas

than an accurate picture of the views of the majority of governments.
Id.
175. Id. at 519.
176. Openedfor signatureJune 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
177. Convention on Conventional Weapons, supranote 169, at 168.
178. Protocol IV, supranote 110, at 167.
179. Geneva Gas Protocol, supranote 173, at 575.
180. Parks, Means and Methods, supranote 174, at 519-20, 526 (explaining that the Protocols
prohibiting non-detectable fragments and blinding laser weapons banned non-existent weapons).
Note, however, that there were claims that the United States was secretly developing laser weapons
that would blind enemies. See Jack H. McCall, Jr., Blinded by the Light: InternationalLaw and the
Legality of Anti-Optic Laser Weapons, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1997). Contra W. Hays Parks,
The ICRC Customary Law Study: A PreliminaryAssessment, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208,
211-12 (2005) ("The Customary Law Study statement that 'Prior to the 1995 Protocol IV to the
CCW, the [United States] was developing a number of laser systems intended to blind either
personnel and/or optical systems,' is categorically false." (alteration in original)).
181. Geneva Gas Protocol, supranote 171, at 575 (emphases added).
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warfare. 182 Furthermore, the codification of the prohibition as a treaty
indicates that such methods of
warfare were not alreadyillegal under the
83
Clause.1
Martens
amorphous
The Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments precludes a nonexistent weapon in a manner that is also largely directed at the weapon's
effects; it states that "[i]t is prohibited to use any weapon the primary
effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body
escape detection by X-Rays.''184 Even if such weapons were to be
created, they are not likely to be designed for the primary purpose of
leaving non-detectable fragments inside enemies-rather, where nondetectable fragments, such as plastics, had been used in weapons before,
the primary purpose was to make the weapons lighter or reduce
production costs. 5' And, though this prohibition was proactive in that it
was based on the determination that non-detectable fragments would
cause superfluous injury, these effects were predictable: non-detectable
fragments, by definition,
cannot be detected, making them unnecessarily
1 86
difficult to remove.
Similarly, Article 1 of Protocol IV states that:
It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as
their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause
permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye
or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting
Parties shall not transfer such weapons to any State or
non-State entity. 187
In prohibiting laser weapons to the extent that their sole or primary
combat function was to cause permanent blindness, it appears that the
principle of unnecessary suffering was the underlying force that drove
the agreement. 88 However, Protocol IV most certainly acts upon the
dictates of the public conscience, as well. 189 Much of the discourse

182. See id.
183. See supra text accompanying note 174.
184. Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra note 172, at 168 (emphasis added).
185. Parks, Means and Methods, supra note 174, at 519-20. If the primary purpose served to
make the weapons lighter or cheaper, and non-detectable fragments were left in the wounded
incidentally, or even secondarily, such a weapon would not come under the prohibition of the
protocol. Id.; see Convention on Conventional Weapons, supranote 172, at 168.
186. See Parks, Means and Methods, supra note 174, at 519-20; see also Convention on
Conventional Weapons, supranote 172, at 168.
187. Protocol IV, supranote 110, at 167.
188. See id.
189. See id; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 130, at 21; Ann Peters, Blinding Laser
Weapons: New Limits on the Technology of Warfare, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 733, 752-53,
755-56 (1996). Note that the military utility deprived by the prohibition of permanently blinding
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around the prohibition of blinding laser weapons focused on the fact that
permanently blinding lasers were perceived as cruel, inhumane weapons;
therefore, they would be contrary to the dictates of the public
conscience-or, at least, public opinion would disfavor them.' 90
In calling for the prohibition of blinding laser weapons, HRW noted
that experts it had consulted:
[W]ere largely in agreement that laser weapons and methods of
warfare that cause blindness would run counter to the requirements of
established custom, humanity, and public conscience. Some experts
expressed either personal repugnance for lasers or the belief that their
countries' civilian population would find the use of blinding as a
method of warfare horrific. 191
HRW found that public opinion could be more negatively affected by
blinding lasers than by weapons that kill outright due to the fact that the
blinded veterans would remain in public view with their disabilities. 192
HRW also found that blinding laser weapons could negatively impact
peace negotiations and societal infrastructure by leaving so many
wounded veterans alive, but permanently maimed. 193
Although blinding laser weapons had not been fielded by any
belligerent in an armed conflict at the time that they were prohibited, the
effects of blinding laser weapons were substantially known.' 94 For
instance, following World War I, stark "images of blinded, shuffling
columns of soldiers, robbed of sight by the use of chemical agents such
as mustard gas, left a lingering impression of the horrors
of... warfare."' 95 The after-effects of permanent blinding were also
widely known to include psychological injuries and a shorter life
expectancy. 196 Since the effects of blinding laser weapons would
laser weapons is slight, considering that temporarily blinding laser weapons, not covered by the
agreement, serve the same or similar purpose. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supra note 9,
at 36 n.100.
190. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 163, at 22-32 (detailing the humanitarian
and legal considerations for prohibiting permanently blinding laser weapons).
191. Id. at 31.
192. Id. at 32.
193. Id.; accord McCall, supra note 180, at 12-13. McCall stated:
Permanent blindness is quite unlike any other type of wound inflicted in warfare.
Most battle casualties-approximately sixty percent-recover fully from their
wounds.... Unlike most combat wounds, however, laser blinding would likely create a
large category of permanently disabled survivors, potentially taxing the resources of any
nation's medical and socio-economic systems.
Id.
194. See McCall, supra note 180, at 43.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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predictably cause many of the same-if not identical-results as
blinding chemical weapons, the "public outcry and revulsion" that was
caused by blinding gases was substantially analogous to that of blinding
laser weapons. 197 As such, the prohibition of poisonous, chemical
weapons served as a blueprint for the prohibition of blinding laser
weapons, and mitigated the fact that there was little or no empirical data
regarding the effects of the blinding laser weapons, which were never
fielded combat.1 98
D. The Martens Clause as the Basis for Prohibitionof
Autonomous Weapon Systems
HRW seeks a prohibition of the research, design, and use of AWS
through the implementation of multinational treaties and national
regulations. 199 Additionally, HRW argues that the Martens Clause
provisions of principles of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience may also invalidate AWS before they come to exist. 00 The
Report finds that, "even if a means of war does not violate an existing
treaty or customary law, it can still be found unlawful if it contravenes
20 1
the principles of humanity or the dictates of public conscience.
Accordingly, the Report interprets the Clause as providing either
supplemental weight to arguments based on traditional pillars of LOAC,
or as a fallback argument in case a multinational prohibitory treaty
should not gain much traction.20 2 The Report states that the Clause:
which encompasses rules beyond those found in treaties, requires that
means of warfare be evaluated according to the "principles of
humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience." Both experts and
laypeople have an [sic] expressed a range of strong opinions about
whether or not fully autonomous machines should be given the power
to deliver lethal force without human supervision. While there is no
consensus, there is certainly a large number for whom the idea is
shocking and unacceptable. States should take their perspective
into
203
account when determining the dictates of public conscience.
The Report further asserts that "any review of fully autonomous
weapons should recognize that for many people these weapons are

197. Id.
198. Id.; see supratext accompanying notes 192-95.
199. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, 5.
200. Id. at 25-26.
201. Id. at 26.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
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unacceptable under the principles laid out in the Martens Clause," and
also found that "fully autonomous weapons would likely contravene the
Martens Clause, which prohibits weapons that run counter to the
'dictates of public conscience. ' '204 Embedded in HRW's Martens Clause
analysis is both an insistence that the Clause creates independently
viable sources of international law-capable of deeming AWS per se
illegal absent codified treaty provisions to the same effect-and the
more generally accepted view that the Martens Clause may supplement
more established treaty or customary principles of the LOAC.2 °5
IV.

OPPOSING A PREEMPTIVE BAN ON

AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS

'A robot may not injure humanity or, through inaction, allow
humanity to come to harm.'
20 6
- Isaac Asimov, The Zeroth Law of Robotics
A.

Categorizingthe Martens Clause Interpretations

The interpretation of the Martens Clause, and the weight afforded
to the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience,
will determine how the Clause can impact-or prevent-the
development or use of AWS in armed conflicts. 207 As discussed in Part
III, the Martens Clause has been interpreted in a variety of ways.20 8 For
the purpose of brevity, three benchmark interpretations of the Clauseone Narrow, one Moderate, and one Broad-will herein be identified
and analyzed for their present potential to prohibit AWS.209
The Narrow View interprets the Martens Clause as merely ensuring
that customary norms of international law are neither preempted by
treaty provisions, nor nullified by the absence of customary norms from
positive treaty provisions.210 The Narrow View does not deem the
principles of humanity or the dictates of the public conscience to be
independent sources of international law.21 1 Under this interpretation,
204. Id.at4,36.
205. See id. at 4, 26, 35.
206. FoUNDATION AND EARTH, supra note 2, at 485. The Zeroth Law was conceived by the
robots themselves to supersede the First Law of Robotics-which dictates that a robot may not harm
a human being-and permits the possibility of harming individual human beings in order to
preserve humanity as a whole. See id
207. See discussion supra Part III.
208. See supraPart IB.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 210-22.
210. Ticehurst, supra note 132, at 126.
211. See id.
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states alone would have the final authority to declare AWS illegal before
they exist, either through the creation of treaties or the establishment of
customary norms. 212 As a result, the Martens Clause-standing for the
proposition that customary international law is not precluded by the
presence or absence of treaty provisions-would only affect the legality
of AWS insofar as customary norms and treaty provisions already
address the same.2 13 Therefore, under the Narrow View, the Martens
Clause alone could not be made to prohibit AWS.
The Moderate View of the Martens Clause identifies the principles
of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience as supplemental
sources of international law, capable of being used in conjunction with
other principles of the LOAC to add additional support to the
proposition that an action violates international law.214 Under the
Moderate View, the two prongs of the Martens Clause-the principles of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience-are not
independently operable sources of law, as are treaty provisions and
customary norms. 21 5 Relying on this interpretation, the Clause could
influence or strengthen a determination that a non-existent weapon
violates the LOAC, but the Clause alone would be insufficient to
prohibit it.216 Under the Moderate View-requiring that the principles of
humanity or the dictates of the public conscience attach to a treaty
provision or customary rule of international law-the Clause is not
presently a serious threat to AWS because the effect of existing treaties
and customs on AWS is debated and unresolved. 1 7 Furthermore, the
principles of the LOAC relied on in Losing Humanity largely require a
case-by-case weighing of factors related to the non-existent weapon's
capabilities,2 18use, and effects-none of which can be evaluated until
AWS exist.
The Broad View of the Martens Clause regards the principles of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience as independently

212. See discussion supra Part I1B.
213. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 16, at 275. Schmitt and Thumher state plainly that
the Martens Clause, "[b]y its own terms... applies only in the absence of treaty law. In other
words, it is a failsafe mechanism meant to address lacunae in the law; it does not act as an
overarching principle that must be considered in every case." Id. (footnote omitted).
214. See Cassese, supra note 24, at 202-07. For example, the Clause's principles of humanity
and the dictates of the public conscience have been used to strengthen and support independently
sufficient violations of treaty provisions. See id.
215. Id. at202.
216. See id.; see also Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supra note 9, at 32.
217. See Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supra note 9, at 32.
218. See id. at 16; see also LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 30-35.
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enforceable sources of international law.2 19 Under this interpretation,
belligerent actors in an armed conflict are bound not only by customary
and treaty law, but also by the principles of humanity and the dictates of
the public conscience.2 20 With these principles elevated to independent
sources of international law, either principle could, if violated,
theoretically prohibit a non-existent weapon. 221 The Broad View is
NGO-friendly in that it may not require states to establish, for example,
a new multinational treaty to invalidate a weapon that violates the
principles of humanity or the dictates of the public conscience.2 22
Therefore, the Broad View is the greatest threat to AWS at the present
2 23
and, naturally, it is the interpretation that Losing Humanity propounds.
B. Advocating Against the BroadInterpretation
Under the Narrow and Moderate Views of the Martens Clause, it is
unlikely that AWS would face much, if any, threat of being
preemptively prohibited because the Clause, so interpreted, does not
elevate the principles of humanity or the dictates of the public
conscience to independent sources of international law.224 Accordingly,
it is imperative that states seeking to protect their interests in
autonomous weapons object fiercely to interpretations of the Martens
Clause that purport to enlarge the principles of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience.225 If NGOs are successful in their attempts to
expand their own influence and law-making authority through expansive
interpretations of the Martens Clause, the power of states to control their
own means and methods of combat will be diminished.226 The principles
of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience are wellestablished aids for interpreting and supplementing the traditional pillars
of the LOAC, but "the Martens [C]lause does not allow one to build
castles of sand .... [I]ts references to principles of humanity and dictates

219. Ticehurst, supra note 132, at 126.
220. Id.
221. See id.; see also Cassese, supra note 24, at 210-11 (explaining that some states have
subscribed to the Broad View and regard the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience as "legally binding standards").
222. See Ticehurst, supra note 132, at 126.
223. See LOSING HUMANITY, supranote 8, at 25-26.
224. See discussion supra Part W.A.
225. See discussion supra Parts IIA,rV.A.
226. See Meron, supranote 131, at 87-88 ("[The Martens Clause] serves as a powerful vehicle
for governments and especially NGOs to push the law ever more to reflect human rights concerns.
Where there already is some legal basis for adopting a more humanitarian position, the Martens
[C]lause enables decision makers to take the extra step forward.").
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of public conscience cannot, alone, delegitimize
weapons and methods
227
cases.
contested
in
especially
war,
of
To prevent the adoption of-or acquiescence to-the Broad View
of the Clause, states must reject this interpretation.228 To do so, states
may, for example, refuse to sign or participate in the formation of
treaties that enlarge the scope of the Clause; domestically interpret the
Clause narrowly in official documents, directives, and judicial decisions;
directly speak out against enlarging interpretations of the Clause; and
forge agreements or treaties with other states that adopt the Narrow or
Moderate View. 22 9 States can also engage each other to discuss the
implications of an expanded Martens Clause, and expose the
shortcomings of the Broad View.230 In particular, the difficulty of
transforming the overly broad principles of humanity and the everchanging dictates of the public conscience into independent sources of
law should be reason enough for most states to prefer the Narrow or
Moderate View of the Clause.23 1
Also note that international actions, especially those in the realm of
armed conflict, involve far more than just humanitarian concerns: the
reality is that "power, reciprocity, and the interests of the parties
involved" are major concerns, in spite of the growing influence of
NGOs, the media, and the public. 232 While the Martens Clause-and the
humanitarian interests it reflects-have achieved successes in restraint of
the conduct of belligerents in armed conflicts, elevating the principles of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience will ultimately stretch
the Clause thin and create an ambiguous field of moral law and public
opinion that may undermine the traditional tenets of the LOAC.233 The
Clause was simply not designed for such use.234
C. State Countermeasures Under the Broad Interpretation
The Martens Clause, broadly interpreted, is uniquely poised to
prohibit AWS before the technology is developed or fielded in combat,
should the principles of humanity or the dictates of the public conscience

227. Id. at 88.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230.
231.

See id. at 88-89.
See id.; see also Joseph Bums Kelly, Gas Warfare in InternationalLaw, 9 MIL. L. REV. 1,

62 (1960) ("The public conscience, though it may shape state policy, is too unreliable to bind states
legally to a pattern of conduct for the future.").
232.
233.
234.

Meron, supra note 131, at 89.
See id. at 88.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-50.
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so demand.235 This is true because the broad interpretation, favored by
HRW, could empower NGOs to command the preemptive prohibition of
AWS merely upon a showing of inhumanity or widespread public
outcry, without relying upon the traditional principles of the LOAC.236
Naturally, the Broad View of the Martens Clause incentivizes the
dissemination of sensationalist, fear-mongering rhetoric aimed at
persuading the public, impressionable states, or NGOs that the
challenged weapons are abhorrent and must be banned before they
exist.237 Although the Broad View is not the generally accepted

interpretation of the Clause, states should nonetheless be prepared to
defend their interests against it. 238 To do so, interested states should
attempt to educate other nations, judiciaries, the public, and relevant
organizations to influence the international marketplace of ideas,
promote the potential benefits of AWS, and establish common standards
of review and implementation for AWS.
1. Dispelling the Science Fiction Dystopia
States opposing a ban of AWS should make clear the distinction of
science fiction and science fact, expose the irrationality of the fictional
theme of robots turning on their creators, and explain that the
development of AWS will follow the incremental growth of robotics
technology. 239 Directly addressing the principles of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience, Losing Humanity claims that, "[b]oth
experts and laypeople have. . . expressed a range of strong opinions
about whether or not fully autonomous machines should be given the
power to deliver lethal force without human supervision. While there is
no consensus, there is certainly a large number for whom the idea is
shocking and unacceptable. 24 ° While the Report states that there is no
consensus-therefore public opinion is currently undecided-the
235. See discussion supraPart IV.A-B.
236. See LOSING HUMANrTY, supra note 8, at 35; Meron, supra note 122, at 88-89. The
dictates of the public conscience may refer to the public at large, states themselves, public officials
or semi-authoritative groups such as NGOs, depending on the meaning given to the term "public."
Meron, supranote 122, at 85.
237. See, e.g., LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 1 (sensationalizing "killer robots"); Kelly,
supra note 227, at 61-62 (explaining that the public conscience, warped by propaganda, is
unreliable); McNeal, supra note 112 (criticizing the "scare tactics" propagated by AWS' critics).
238. Cassese, supra note 24, at 202 (noting that a majority of cases cited the Martens Clause in
a supplemental manner); see supraPart IV.A-B.
239. See Anderson & Waxman, Law and Ethics, supra note 104, at 4, 11 (discussing the
incremental development of autonomous weapons, and the benefit of building such weapons with
principles of the LOAC in mind); see also LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 4 (confusing
dystopian science fiction for science fact).
240. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 35.
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reasoning addresses the principles of humanity in an overly literal
manner by equating Human-out-of-the-Loop systems with the Martens
Clause's principles of humanity. 24' The Report, however, misses the
point: a literally inhuman weapon system may prove to be far more
humane than human soldiers could ever be.242
The Report's reasoning is actually propagandizing, and it is notably
consistent with themes of science fiction entertainment 243 as well as the
sensationalist media coverage of AWS, and robots, generally. 244 Itself no
stranger to yellow journalism and eye-catching headlines, Losing
Humanity's subtitle-The Case Against Killer Robots-shows that245the
publication connotes, and even lauds, the man versus machine myth.
Science fiction has long been a successful forum for exploring the
human condition and social issues, but it has also been a forum rich in
horror, uncontrollable creations, and malevolence.2 46 The classic science
fiction theme, referenced in Losing Humanity, is that our own creations
will turn on us, resulting in "terrifying consequences. 247 This is the
theme of Frankenstein,248 as well as many modem movies, 249 and "[t]he
popular reaction.., is a demand for more control immediately, whether
or not it is advisable. 250

241. Seeid. at35-36.
242. See ARKIN, supranote 6, at 29-31; see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.
243. See, e.g., Christine Corcos et al., Double-Take: A Second Look at Cloning, Science
Fiction and Law, 59 LA. L. REv. 1041, 1061-62 (1999) ("[Science fiction] films ... depict future
worlds destroyed by science and technology run amok .... ); Malinowski, supra note 112, at A23
("[Tihe danger of delegating warfare to machines has been a central theme of modem science
fiction.").
244. See, e.g., John Roach, Ban Killer Robots Before They Go Berserk, Group Says, NBC
NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/futureoftech/ban-killer-robots-they-go-berserk-groupsays-IC7182082 (last visited July 18, 2013) (reporting that an autonomous robot "could confuse a
young girl with an ice cream cone for a soldier with a gun and kill her"); Sharkey, supra note 20
(referring to AWS as "mindless killer robots" and "autonomous killers"); see also Emma Hughes &
Jenny Kitzinger, Science Fiction Fears? An Analysis of How People Use Science Fiction in
Discussing Risk and Emerging Science and Technology 3 (Soc. Contexts & Responses to Risk
Network, Working Paper No. 28, 2008) ("Film makers use technologies such as cloning or genetic
research as themes in horror or science-fiction dystopias and these threatening themes or images are
also borrowed by documentary makers and news journalists." (citation omitted)).
245. See generally LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8 (rousing fear of "killer robots"); see also
Allenby, supra note 107 ("The Frankensteinian label of 'killer robots' is good PR, and good fantasy
noir, but blinks reality.").
246. Corcos et. al., supranote 243, at 1056.
247. Id.
248. See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Bantam ed. 2003) (depicting a tale of a
man-made monster that turns on its creator).
249. Corcos et. al., supranote 243, at 1060-1063.
250. Id. at 1063.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss3/8

32

Evans: At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Martens

20131

AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THE MARTENS CLAUSE

729

To overcome the negative impact of dystopian futures appropriated
by NGOs and the media, states seeking to develop and use AWS should
educate nations, the public, and the media about the true nature of the
technological art and the incremental development of autonomy that will
enable such weapons. 5 1' Additionally, military secrecy in weapon
development should be carefully navigated, and transparency should be
strategically, but reasonably, employed. 52 The appearance of secrecy
breeds distrust, as is made apparent in HRW's report accusing the
United States of secretly testing blinding laser weapons in the decade
before Protocol IV was enacted.25 3 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew
Waxman suggest that the United States adopt a policy of transparency
with regards to the testing and safety precautions-if not the
programming or offensive capabilities-of AWS, thereby "shaping the
normative terrain" and establishing global standards for AWS.2 54 By
making the policy decisions surrounding AWS transparent, best
practices can be established while technical results and processes
can necessarily remain secret or shared only with allies to protect
military advantage.255
Governments themselves may also issue official directives, policy
statements, or legal reviews to establish their practices regarding AWS
and to begin building a body of customary norms. 256 The Directive-by
establishing DoD policy, approval chains, review procedures, and safety
precautions-addresses AWS responsibly and creates standards for their
development, testing, and use that can be adopted as best practices by
other states in the future.2 57 Furthermore, the Directive undercuts at least
one of Losing Humanity's fears in that, absent special approval by
several U.S. military authorities, fully autonomous weapons will not be
permitted to target human beings .258

251. See Anderson & Waxman, Law and Ethics, supranote 104, at 24-25.
252. Id. at 25-26.
253. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 163, at 3-4.
254. Anderson & Waxman, Law and Ethics, supranote 104, at 3, 24-26.
255. Id. at 24-25.
256. See id at 25-26; see also, e.g., DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supra note 14, at I (establishing
DoD policy "for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in
weapon systems").
257. See generally DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, supra note 14 (outlining the research,
development, and use of AWS in the U.S. armed forces).
258. See id at 3 ("Human-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used to select and
engage targets, with the exception of selecting humans as targets, for local defense to intercept
attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for [defense of manned installations and
platforms]....").
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2. Humanitarian Potential
States should reiterate what scholars, military experts, and
roboticists have posited: in the future, AWS could be more compliant
with the principles of the LOAC than human soldiers, and may permit
armed conflicts to be fought with fewer inhumane consequences. 5 9
These predictions not only help to allay fears of "killer robots" run
amok, but also suggest that a prohibition of the research and
development of AWS would not only be premature but irresponsible as
well.26 ° Prohibiting the development of AWS "may have the effect of
denying commanders a tool for minimizing the risk to civilians ....
It is well documented that humans are imperfect soldiers, and the
experience of war can cause some soldiers to violate the standards of the
LOAC.262 The effects of battle can increase a soldier's propensity to
commit atrocities and suffer mental breakdowns; studies have found that
the more time a soldier spends in a battle zone, the more likely these
results become.263 In this respect, AWS may have distinct advantages
over human soldiers: machines experience no desire for selfpreservation, anger, frustration, or fear of death.264
Losing Humanity ignores these facts and asserts that robotslacking empathy and compassion-will cause more harm than human
soldiers. 265 HRW audaciously champions "the superiority of human
emotions in controlling targeting and firing of weapons, [and] human
empathy over human fear., 266 However, HRW's "humanitarian"
recommendation to preemptively ban AWS could actually result in a
counter-humanitarian outcome: machines may "reduce risks to civilians
by making targeting more precise and firing decisions more controlled

259. See ARKIN, supra note 6, at 29-30; Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supranote 9,
at 25; Don Troop, Robots at War: Scholars Debatethe EthicalIssues, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept.
14, 2012, at Al; see also discussion supra Part H.C.2.
260. See Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, supranote 9, at 36-37.
261. Id.Schmitt also notes that "[i]t runs counter to the object and purpose of [the LOAC] to
suggest that a weapon system that reduces harm to combatants in situations in which its use does not
aggravate civilian risk should be unlawful." Id. at 36.
262. ARKIN, supranote 6, at 29.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
264. ARKIN, supranote 6, at 29-30.
265. LOSING HuMANITY, supra note 8, at 38. The Report suggests that AWS would be perfect
for a repressive autocrat, because "[e]ven the most hardened troops can eventually turn on their
leader if ordered to fire on their own people." Id. The Report goes on to suggest that AWS, on the
other hand, would crush the rebels because the "[r]obots would not identify with their victims and
would have to follow orders no matter how inhumane they were." Id.
266. Anderson, supranote 20; cf LOSING HUMANITY, supranote 8, at 37-38.
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[]especially compared to human-soldier failings that are so often
exacerbated by fear, panic, vengeance, or other emotions ....
3. Establishing Common Standards for Testing and Evaluation
States who have an interest in the creation and use of AWS should
268
foster a common set of standards for their evaluation and testing.
Common standards would serve to legitimatize efforts to create these
weapons safely and in compliance with the LOAC from the ground
up. 269 Furthermore, common standards of review and compliance would
prevent unscrupulous states from developing AWS with "few or no
constraints at all. 27 °
D. An UnprecedentedProhibition
The prohibition on the use and transference of blinding laser
weapons is a modem arms control agreement that banned a weapon that
had never been fielded in combat. 271 There was, however, a surfeit of
data on the effects of mass permanent blinding when Protocol IV was
created.272 The discourse surrounding this agreement was focused, in
part, on the application of the Martens Clause and the implications of the
public conscience.273 The resulting protocol, however, textually prohibits
blinding laser weapons purely on the basis of the weapons' effects.274
Attempts to prohibit specific weapons-particularly those that do
not yet exist-on the basis of the dictates of the public conscience
should be rejected. Before the dictates of the public conscience can be
accepted, hypothetically, as an independent source of law, two questions
2 75
must be definitively answered: What public? and Whose conscience?
If these dictates are merely a matter of public opinion, then the Clause

267. Anderson & Waxman, Law andEthics,supranote 104, at 15.
268. Id. at 24-26.
269. See id. at 25.
270. Id. at 3, 20.
271. Parks, Means and Methods, supra note 174, at 519-20, 526.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 186-98.
273. See McCall, supra note 180, at 29-32.
274. See Protocol IV, supra note 110, at 167 ("It is prohibited to employ laser weapons
specifically designed... to cause permanent blindness .. " (emphasis added)). Likewise, the
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments prohibits the use of certain weapons on the basis of those
weapons' effects. Convention on Conventional Weapons, supra note 172, at 168 ("It is prohibited to
use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by [non-detectable] fragments ....
"
(emphasis added)). But see Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 173, at 575 (prohibiting the use of
certain gases in armed conflict on the basis that such gases had "been justly condemned by the
general opinion of the civilised world").
275. Cf Meron, supra note 131, at 85.
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would be overly vague and prone to endless fluctuations.276 If the public
disagrees over what is conscionable, how will a judiciary decide?
Perhaps more importantly, how will states know what practices are
prohibited as result of the dictates of public conscience?
Even if the Martens Clause withstands attacks to its vague nature,
AWS should not be banned on the tenuous predictions of NGOs or
foreboding themes of science fiction.2 77 In the past, the High Contracting
Parties to the Geneva Gas Protocol were spurred to act, in part, by the
"horrific" nature of those weapons' effects. 78 Where the effects of such
weapons were known, and were truly found to be abhorrent, the dictates
of the public conscience were legitimately considered, although the
Clause was never found to independently operate to prohibit a
challenged weapon.279 Unlike permanently blinding lasers and
poisonous gases, there is no history-devastating or otherwise-of the
effects of AWS in combat: such systems do not yet exist. 280 Therefore,
claims that AWS will have horrifying, inhumane effects are presently
just speculation.281
V.

CONCLUSION

'How do you decide what is injurious,or not injurious, to humanity
as a whole?'
28
- Isaac Asimov 2
This Note concludes that, because AWS do not yet exist and there
is no empirical data on the effects of such systems, the Martens Clause
2 83
currently poses a discernible, but tenuous, threat to their legality.
While there are many interpretations of the Clause, the Broad View
applied by HRW could, if successful, establish the principles of
humanity and dictates of the public conscience as independent standards
of international law. 284 Losing Humanity claims that the public
276. McCall, supranote 180, at 30-31.
277.

See supra Part III.A-C.

278.

McCall, supra note 180, at 31.

279.

See discussion supra Part III.C.

280. See discussion supra Part II.C-D; see also LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 1.
281. See Anderson, supra note 20 (criticizing Losing Humanity as a "factually speculative
report").
282. FOUNDATION AND EARTH, supra note 2, at 486 ("In theory, the Zeroth Law was the
answer to our problems. In practice, we could never decide. A human being is a concrete object.
Injury to a person can be estimated and judged. Humanity is an abstraction. How do we deal with
it?" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
283. See discussion supraPart IV.A-B.
284. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 8, at 35-36; see also supraPart 1V.A-B.
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conscience will-if it does not already-dictate that AWS are inhumane
and abhorrent.2 85 Under the Broad View of the Clause, an authoritative
finding that AWS violate the dictates of the public conscience could
2 86
result in the prohibition of such weapons, whether they exist or not.
Although this interpretation is by no means the majority view, it is not
completely unsupported.28 7
Even if the Broad View becomes accepted, states can still protect
their interests in developing autonomous weapons. In so doing,
governments should issue policy statements and legal reviews of AWS
that elucidate the scientific reality of such systems and dispel the
dystopian fears disseminated by NGOs and the media.288 States should
also emphasize the potential humanitarian benefits of AWS-to impact
public opinion-and establish common standards for evaluating and
testing AWS, creating a framework of best practices and customary
norms. 289 Finally, states should adamantly object to attempts to prohibit
non-existent weapons to avoid setting adverse precedents in the area
of weapons regulation. 290 Though the future of autonomy in weapons
systems is uncertain, a preemptive prohibition of such systems on the
basis of the Martens Clause should not be forged.291 Whether the
Clause is a mere relic or something more remains to be seen, but its
potential for expanded use in deciding matters of international law
remains as present as ever, and "[a]t odd and unpredictable times, we
cling in fright to the past.'292
Tyler D. Evans*

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

LOsING HUMANITY, supranote 8, at 35-36.
See supra Part IV.
See Ticehurst, supra note 123, at 128-29.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.1-2.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.1-3.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.
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